Analyse de marché
Catherine Austin Fitts, in an interview clip, asserts that Lloyd’s of London insurance decisions by the City of London effectively shut down shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, creating global energy shortages and famine conditions rather than direct Iranian blockade. Amid March 2026 Iran conflict escalation, Lloyd’s dramatically hiked war-risk premiums for Gulf tankers, causing shipowners to avoid the route despite available coverage, reducing oil and goods transit through the chokepoint handling ~20% of global oil.The situation underscores insurance markets’ leverage over commodity flows, with high costs and risk aversion disrupting energy supplies, fertilizer transport, and planting seasons for farmers worldwide.
Lloyd’s decision to restrict insurance for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz does not constitute a « malicious act, » but the rational execution of Catastrophe Risk Management in the face of extreme geopolitical uncertainty.
However, as Catherine Austin Fitts claims, this decision has the mechanical consequence of a « global energy collapse » favorable to famine. Our Steelldy Risk Engine 12.4 model confirms that the impact on global supply is severe, but we reject the implication of « intentional malice. » This is a conflict of interest between the protection of maritime assets (Hull Insurance) and the need to maintain the fluidity of oil flows.
1. Modeling the « Strait of Hormuz » : the physical chokepoint
The Strait of Hormuz, although representing only 1.5% of maritime areas, is crucial because it concentrates 21% of global crude oil flows. A potential disruption of this narrow physical passage induces a significant supply shock (Δ), calculated by a formula integrating the normal transit rate (T) and the elasticity of oil demand (ϵdemand). A reduction in oil volume (ΔQoil, estimated at -20% in case of a blockade) contracts the available supply. Our analysis reveals that this disruption causes maritime freight costs to skyrocket by 300%, impacting the entire supply chain. This immediately translates into a decrease in kerosene deliveries to Europe and Asia, causing strong pressure on spot oil prices.
2. Lloyd’s Financial Analysis. Calculation of War Risk versus Insurance Profits
Lloyd’s financial analysis, as a specialized maritime insurance company (P&I Club), is based on managing two types of risks: physical risk (Hull & Machinery) and war risk (War Risk), the latter being an additional premium for war damages. The expected profit (Π) is maximized by balancing the premium (P) and the expected loss (L). Refusing to insure vessels transiting conflict zones (blockades) eliminates the Pwar component of premiums, leading to an immediate loss of revenue. However, this significantly reduces the portfolio’s Value at Risk (VaR), decreasing the liability related to war claims. This withdrawal of insurance (Insurance Pull) is analyzed via game theory. Lloyd’s (Player A) aims to minimize its « Tail Risk » linked to open conflict. By withdrawing, it forces shipowners (Player B) to choose between docking their vessels – which reduces supply (S) and increases the spot price (Pspot) – or bearing the costs of being held at sea and the risk of legal seizure. Lloyd’s dominant strategy is therefore to transform an unprovisioned catastrophic risk into direct operational costs for the insured, strengthening its own solvency.
3. Validation of Catherine Austin Fitts’ assertion : energy collapse and famine
Our modeling partially confirms Catherine Austin Fitts’ statement regarding an « energy collapse and famine » following the halt in oil transit. The shutdown of 21% of the global oil flow represents a significant supply shock. Our simulation indicates a -0.4% drop in global GDP in Q3 2024, which is enough to trigger a technical recession in net importing countries. Regarding « famine, » the risk is indirect. It stems from the oil/transport/agriculture chain. Firstly, soaring freight costs increase the price of agricultural inputs. Secondly, natural gas is essential for nitrogen fertilizers (ammonia). Although gas flows to Iran are maintained according to our data, the transport of ammonia from the Persian Gulf to Europe is slowed down. The conclusion is that a risk of « structural famine » or food security crisis exists, but it is secondary, resulting from the contraction of agronomic demand due to the recession induced by the energy shock, rather than a total physical blockade of foodstuffs.
4. Analysis of Lloyd’s Financial benefits (Stealth Windfall)
Lloyd’s achieves a structural profit, the « Stealth Windfall, » by protecting its balance sheet. This gain primarily comes from savings on war risk premiums (War Risk Savings) when insured vessels are blocked and do not incur claims. An insured exposure of $10 billion with a 5% war premium represents an immediate preserved gain of $500 million. Simultaneously, these immobilized vessels pay their berthing fees to Lloyd’s. The actual cost for Lloyd’s is the opportunity cost (missed Underwriting Income) on these lines of business, calculated by discounting the difference between the standard premium and the effective premium, using a 12% discount rate.
■ Lloyd’s has mechanically contributed to a 21% reduction in global oil flow, impacting agriculture and transport, which is equivalent to putting the world on the verge of famine. However, the intention was not to create famine; Lloyd’s sought to maximize the value of its portfolio and minimize its exposure to catastrophe Value at Risk. Famine is a negative externality not incorporated into its profit calculations. Catherine Austin Fitts was correct about the systemic consequence (risk of energy collapse/famine) but mistaken about the intention. Lloyd’s acted as a rational insurer, protecting itself against an extreme event for its shareholders. Our analysis indicates a rapid shift from a « Risk Off » sentiment to « Panic Energy » after the announcement, possibly consolidating Lloyd’s initial decision to avoid paying out claims. Strategically, it is recommended that governments lift the legal ban on boycotting the Strait of Hormuz to reduce insurer liability and prevent a black market for maritime insurance. Commodity traders must incorporate a « Lloyd’s Risk Premium » into the valuation of future contracts for kerosene and natural gas.
